ASEAN suffers collateral damage from BRICS expansion

The recent expansion of BRICS, which several ASEAN countries want to join, signals a potentially pivotal shift in Southeast Asia’s geopolitical landscape.

Key takeaways:

At the recent BRICS summit held in Russia in October, 13 countries were admitted as partner countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Along with Laos and Myanmar, which have not yet been granted partner status, six ASEAN member states are now seeking to join the group. While BRICS does not challenge ASEAN directly, the Southeast Asian bloc is bracing for the collateral damage of losing its centrality and relevance with the emergence of a new polarity, particularly as Donald Trump returns to the US presidency in January.

BRICS is seen by its current and prospective members as a vehicle for diverse ambitions. China and Russia consider the bloc a political and economic rival to the Western-led global order and institutions. Other members from the Global South, including emerging powers like India, reckon it addresses their lack of representation and influence in the Western-dominated international institutions. 

Likewise, the motivations of the ASEAN states for joining BRICS are diverse. Malaysia and Thailand, for instance, see BRICS membership as offering ways to boost trade, attract investment, and amplify their influence on the global stage. Malaysia, in particular, wants stronger ties with China, which is already its largest trading partner. Thailand’s coalition government strives to energize the country’s economy and international standing after “lost” years of political crises and military rule. Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy, is carefully weighing up the potential economic advantages of BRICS membership against the possible geopolitical risks, given its emphasis on balancing alliances in a rapidly shifting global order.

The rationale of geopolitical balancing seems to be an important factor in the countries’ interest in joining BRICS. Indonesia and Thailand are also pursuing membership in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), signaling their ambition to strike a balance between old and emerging international orders. Meanwhile, Vietnam’s cautious approach is part of its “bamboo diplomacy” to manage relations with major powers, including China and the United States.

For Malaysia and Indonesia, both Muslim-majority countries, their BRICS bids coincided with their robust advocacy against the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, which has put them at odds with most Western governments. According to a 2024 annual survey of regional elite opinion, some 83.1% of Malaysian respondents and 74.7% of Indonesians referred to the Israel-Hamas conflict as their most concerning geopolitical event, much higher than the regional average (46.5%). 

Myanmar, still grappling with domestic crises, also views BRICS as a channel to maintain economic lifelines and, like Russia, to break through war-triggered international isolation. Meanwhile, nations like Cambodia, which have not yet formally expressed an interest in joining, already enjoy close ties to key BRICS members China and Russia and are closely monitoring BRICS developments as they seek diversifying economic partnerships to reduce reliance on Western-led international institutions. 

Eroding ASEAN centrality

The participation of ASEAN members in BRICS reflects a pragmatic shift in the bloc. Limited by structural challenges and an inability or unwillingness to achieve greater integration to the same degree as the European Union, ASEAN faces ongoing regional crises that raise serious questions about its legitimacy. The ongoing Myanmar civil war and unresolved South China Sea disputes expose ASEAN’s limitations in delivering cohesive, region-wide solutions, further motivating its members to seek collaborative frameworks like BRICS for enhanced diplomatic and economic resilience.

“ASEAN centrality,” the notion that the bloc holds a core position in regional diplomacy and unity, has increasingly shown its limitations. However, this concept remains critical because it creates the potential for the Southeast Asian nations—most of whom have limited international influence—to maintain a unified voice in regional and global diplomacy. Combined, ASEAN has the world’s fifth-largest economy,  with about 4% of global GDP.  By leading initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership trade bloc and ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, not to mention its annual summits attended by world leaders, the Southeast Asian grouping ensures that its members, many of which are small and emerging powers, can collectively navigate complex geopolitical challenges, including balancing relationships with larger powers like China and the US. This centrality helps ASEAN manage diverse interests while preserving and advancing regional peace, stability, and economic integration​.

However, BRICS expansion threatens ASEAN’s centrality because it provides an alternative platform for economic growth and strategic autonomy, drawing members toward more flexible and pragmatic partnerships. As ASEAN members deepen ties with BRICS nations, particularly China, they may prioritize BRICS-driven initiatives in areas like infrastructure and the digital economy, sidelining ASEAN’s vision of unified multilateral cooperation.

However, BRICS isn’t the only group that is challenging the bloc’s centrality. So, too, are minilateral frameworks like the QUAD—a compact between the US, Japan, Australia, and India—and SQUAD (the US, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines). These alliances provide issue-specific trade, security, and diplomacy collaboration, appealing to ASEAN nations that want quicker, more targeted solutions. Meanwhile, ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, struggle to maintain relevance, as shown by the failure to produce joint statements at recent events. 

Global perspectives

BRICS expansion is also likely to pressure ASEAN countries to align more closely with the US or China, spurring regional polarization. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January, US foreign policy in the next four years is expected to focus on more direct engagement, bypassing multilateral mechanisms and platforms (including ASEAN) with a preference for bilateral and mini-lateral formats. In his first term, Trump attended only one US-ASEAN summit (in 2017), before sending then-Vice President Mike Pence in 2018 and then-National Security Adviser Robert O’Brian in 2019 and 2020. China will opportunistically want to fill the power vacuum created by the Trump administration’s isolationist tendencies, including by leveraging BRICS expansion. Even as Beijing challenges the US-led liberal international framework in the region, Washington will likely respond by further deepening its Indo-Pacific alliances, such as the Quad.  

Then there’s Russia’s role as a key BRICS member. Moscow wants to use the grouping to maintain and strengthen its influence in Southeast Asia, primarily through energy deals and arms exports, even as its traditional regional ties wane. By aligning with China within BRICS, Russia supports Beijing’s ambitions and reinforces the bloc’s influence as a counterbalance to the US. This partnership complicates ASEAN’s neutral stance, particularly in the South China Sea, where Russia’s alignment with China against Western intervention further caps ASEAN’s ability to act independently.

The EU stands to be negatively affected by these developments, as it has championed ASEAN centrality in its approach to the region and has fostered ties with ASEAN as part of its broader Indo-Pacific engagement strategy. Brussels has sought to offer a “third option” for Southeast Asia that emphasizes economic collaboration over military alliances and leverages its balanced approach between Chinese-styled authoritarian capitalism and the turbo-capitalism championed by the US.

Future for ASEAN

To address the challenge posed to its centrality and geopolitical polarization, ASEAN leaders must focus on enhancing institutional cohesion and addressing structural weaknesses. Strengthening ASEAN-led platforms, such as the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, is crucial for sustaining regional influence. To offset the economic appeal of BRICS, it should double down on regional economic integration while exploring “third options” offered by partners like the EU and Gulf states. This presents a unique opening for the EU to position itself more effectively in Southeast Asia as it seeks to build international partnerships to offset China’s influence. 

To maintain its relevance, ASEAN and its member states must balance engagement with BRICS and other emerging platforms by diversifying its partnerships and avoiding over-reliance on any single bloc. Strategic participation in minilateral frameworks like the Quad should be carefully calibrated to complement, not undermine, ASEAN unity. Inclusive dialogues that bring together BRICS, Western allies, and other stakeholders can solidify ASEAN’s role as a neutral intermediary in an increasingly polarized global order.

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