Indonesia needs to look beyond the US in boosting its coast guard

Key takeaways:

Indonesia’s only training center for its coast guard, the Bakamla, is located in Batam. The construction started in 2021 in a partnership between Bakamla and the US embassy in Indonesia before finally opening in 2024. Located near the waters of North Natuna Sea, where China has claimed part of the area through its nine-dash line, its geopolitical importance cannot be understated. However, whether Indonesia will be able to continue to rely on the US to build up the Bakamla is under doubt. With the first Trump administration largely apathetic toward Southeast Asia, it is reasonable to expect lessened US engagement with states in the region, including Indonesia under the new leadership in Washington.

This cannot come at a more inopportune time for Indonesia. Tensions around the South China Sea have been increasing lately with Chinese fishing vessels encroaching Indonesian waters as recently as late October 2024. The visit of Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia’s new president, to China in early November 2024 was criticized for giving the appearance of Indonesia capitulating to China’s nine-dash line—a joint statement put out by the leaders acknowledges that Beijing and Jakarta have overlapping claims in the South China Sea, contradicting Indonesia’s previous stance.

With Indonesian lawmakers and analysts worrying that Indonesia’s sovereignty might be affected by this issue, Indonesia needs a more capable coast guard to protect the security of its waters. This includes more training centers for the Bakamla, ideally located not only near the North Natuna Sea but also other flashpoints across the archipelago. Indonesia has no fewer than six maritime choke points, all of which are utilized for international navigation—Malacca Strait, the Lombok Strait, the Wetar Strait, the Sunda Strait, the Singapore Strait, and the Ombai Strait. These chokepoints are used not only in international navigation and transport of high-value commodities like oil and gas, but also serve as strategic routes for military vessels of navies from blue water countries. 

With Washington likely stepping back for the foreseeable future, Indonesia needs to look for new partners in helping it develop its coast guard. Jakarta should consider cooperating with America’s Quad partners, Japan, Australia, and India, and also select EU member states, particularly those with a strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific.  

The Quad and Indonesia’s coast guard

The US potentially becoming less active in the Indo-Pacific is something that its Quad partners will also have to deal with, and a deeper cooperation in the maritime sector with Indonesia might just be something Tokyo, Canberra, and New Delhi need to mitigate the probable loss of US interest.

Japan and Indonesia have solid cooperation already when it comes to their coast guards. In February 2024, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) sent three of its Mobile Cooperation Team (MCT) members specializing in capacity-building on maritime safety and security to Bakamla. Furthermore, In July 2024, Japan donated a new patrol vessel to Bakamla as part of its policy aimed at improving diplomatic relations and enhancing maritime security with countries Japan considers to be pertinent to maintaining regional stability and countering China’s influence. Jakarta should build on the existing cooperation and explore the possibility of Tokyo helping it build more Bakamla training centers, particularly in strategic points around the North Natuna Sea and around the Malacca Strait. Such a cooperation would in turn enable Tokyo’s deeper role in shaping the maritime security of Southeast Asia’s largest country and pushing back against Beijing’s ambitions.

Australia, on the other hand, could be approached to explore the possibilities of building Bakamla training centers in strategic locations around the two Indonesian straits closest to Australia: Lombok and Sunda straits. Jakarta and Canberra should use the momentum forged by their burgeoning defense ties in 2024, with the signing of the most significant bilateral defense pact to-date in August 2024, followed by joint military drills in the island of Java in November 2024.

Meanwhile, India has approached the Indonesian government to develop the strategically located Sabang port in Aceh on the northern part of Sumatra, right next to the Malacca Strait. The impetus is thus there to amplify these talks into having India help Indonesia build more Bakamla training centers in strategic locations around the Malacca Strait. 

For Indonesia, shaping deeper maritime and defense ties with three Quad members, all of whom are relevant powers and strategic actors in the Indo-Pacific is crucial, considering also the recent reaffirmation of its long-standing non-aligned stance. 

Opportunity for European powers?

In spite of having adopted an Indo-Pacific strategy back in 2021, the EU as a whole needs to refresh its policies towards the region. With the US predicted to grow more isolationist in the near future, European powers have an opportunity to fill the void. This is especially true for EU member states with their own Indo-Pacific guidelines, such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Having European powers help Asia’s greatest “geopolitical prize” shape a crucial part of its maritime security will boost European credibility in the region and enable it to be taken more seriously as a strategic actor in the Indo-Pacific.

France, being the sole EU member with territories in the Indo-Pacific, is unsurprisingly better positioned than other EU member states to engage with Indonesia on maritime security. During Subianto’s days as Indonesia’s defense minister, prior to becoming president, the defense ties between Jakarta and Paris burgeoned to the point where Subianto himself called France Indonesia’s main geopolitical and geostrategic partner. His positive perception of France has endured even after he became president. From the purchase of Rafale fighter jets to collaboration on the production of high-tech Scorpène Evolved submarines, Indonesia and France are in a prime position to enlarge their defense ties by having France assist Indonesia in improving Bakamla’s capabilities. 

Of course, just because France is ahead, it does not preclude other European partners engaging in a more meaningful relationship with Indonesia. Germany, for example, has a solid defense partnership with Vietnam already and is working to improve its defense cooperation with the Philippines. Approaching Indonesia to help Jakarta build more training centers for Bakamla could be a good move for Berlin to ponder, especially since both Germany and Indonesia are already moving toward a strategic partnership to begin with. The Netherlands could likewise examine the possibility of collaborating with Paris and Berlin to help out Indonesia’s Bakamla, considering that the Netherlands and Indonesia  agreed to further strengthen cooperation in the maritime sector in 2023. 

Beyond security

Engagement between Indonesia and its partners on maritime security could also be seen as a chance to reap economic benefits for all parties involved. This entails procurement or development of relevant resources for the training centers to function, such as building materials, training equipment, and study materials, but also a potential for a deeper maritime development such as India’s plan to develop the Sabang Port. This plan can be studied by Japan or the Netherlands to develop other ports in Indonesia that are in dire need of rejuvenation. 

Helping Indonesia with its maritime security might also convince Jakarta to be more willing to align with the geopolitical goals of its partners. For example, Australia assisting Indonesia’s coast guard may open up an avenue for Canberra to seek an even more extensive defense pact with Jakarta in the future. France and Germany can also utilize the development of  Bakamla training centers and ports in Indonesia as a source of goodwill to resume the talks on the elusive Free Trade Agreement between the EU and Indonesia in a more positive atmosphere, especially considering the recent worsening of Indonesia’s perceptions of the EU. If every actor here plays their cards right, this could be a geopolitical win-win for all involved parties. 

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